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Original UN document, courtesy of The Sussex Harvard Information Bank 
 
 
“The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all 
analogous liquids, materials or devices has been justly condemned by 
the general opinion of the civilized world, and a prohibition of such use 
has been declared in treaties to which a majority of civilized Powers are 
parties. The High Contracting Parties therefore agree absolutely to 
prohibit the export from their territories of any such asphyxiating, 
poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, intended or 
designed for use in connection with operations in war…” 
 
Senator Theodore Burton, A.13.1925.IX, 5th May 1929 
(emphasis added) 
  
General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, circa 1925 
Courtesy of Polish National Archive 
Original HM Stationary Office document, courtesy of The Sussex Harvard Information Bank 
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Original UN documents, courtesy of The Sussex Harvard Information Bank 
“…Poison gas and toxic substances…were not used in the Second 
World War when the Geneva Protocol of 1925…was already in 
place…” (USSR ENDC/PV.386)  
“…nothing should be done that would damage or undermine the ban 
already expressed…” (Sweden ENDC /PV.391) 
“… the whole subject needs to be carried a step beyond the position 
as it is today, but without detriment to the validity and importance of 
the Protocol…” (India ENDC/PV.389)  
“…We consider as useful the suggestion that the Secretariat should 
prepare a report on the effects of the use of bacteriological and 
chemical weapons…” (Poland ENDC/PV.385) 
 
 
“…Today I would once again repeat that nothing that I 
have in mind would in any way limit or derogate from 
obligations assumed by States Parties to the Geneva 
Protocol… Indeed I suggest that any convention that may 
be submitted should make this abundantly clear, both in 
the preambular form and also by an operative article which 
might be along the following lines”  
 
“Nothing contained in the present Convention shall be 
construed as in any way limiting or derogating from 
obligations assumed by any State under the Geneva 
Protocol of 17 June 1925” 
 
Mr Mulley, UK, ENDC/PV.404, 17th April 1969 
 
Original HM Stationary Office document, courtesy of The Sussex Harvard Information Bank 
 
“The Conference stresses the importance of the withdrawal of 
all reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol” 
(Final Document 3rd Review Conference) 
 
“The conference reaffirms that the use by the States Parties in 
any way or under any circumstances of microbial or other 
biological agents or toxins, that is not consistent with 
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes  is 
effectively a violation of Article 1 of the Convention…” 
(Final Document 4th Review Conference) 
 
“The Conference notes that the Islamic Republic of Iran has 
formally presented a proposal to amend Article I and the title of 
the Convention to include explicitly the prohibition of the use…” 
 (Final Document 4th and 6th Review Conferences) 
 
 
 

“The Conference appeals to all States Parties to the 1925 
Geneva Protocol to fulfill their obligations assumed under 
that Protocol and urges all states not yet party to the 
Protocol to ratify or accede to it without further delay” 
(Final Document 7th Review Conference) 
 
 
Raw data: http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/ 
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“The Conference acknowledges that the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol…and the Convention complement each other. 
The Conference reaffirms that nothing contained in the 
Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or 
detracting from the obligations assumed by any state 
under the 1925 Geneva Protocol” 
(Final Document 7th Review Conference) 
“The Conference stresses the importance of the 
withdrawal of all reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol 
related to the Convention” 
(Final Document 7th Review Conference) 
Geneva Protocol High Contracting Parties with explicit reservations 
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“The Conference recalls the actions which States Parties 
have taken to withdraw their reservations to the 1925 
Geneva Protocol related to the Convention, and calls upon 
those States Parties that continue to maintain pertinent 
reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol to withdraw 
those reservations, and to notify the Depositary of the 
1925 Geneva Protocol accordingly, without delay” 
(Final Document 7th Review Conference) 
“The Conference notes that reservations concerning 
retaliation, through the use of any of the objects prohibited 
by the Convention, even conditional, are totally 
incompatible with the absolute and universal prohibition of 
the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition and 
retention of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, 
with the aim to exclude completely and forever the 
possibility of their use.” 
(Final Document 7th Review Conference)  
“The Conference notes that the Secretary-General’s 
investigation mechanism, set out in A/44/561 and 
endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 45/57, 
represents an international institutional mechanism for 
investigating cases of alleged use of biological or toxin 
weapons. The Conference notes national initiatives to 
provide relevant training to experts that could support the 
Secretary-General’s investigative mechanism.” 
(Final Document 7th Review Conference)  
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